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From Global Commons to Territorial Seas: A 
Naval Analogy for the Nationalization of 
Cyberspace1 
Sam J. Tangredi2 
 
Abstract: As one of the engines of modern globalization, the internet is perceived as having 
broken down barriers between cultures, ideologies and societies, and created a “democratization 
of technology.”  An analogy generated by this perception is that cyberspace is a “global common” 
similar to the oceanic “high seas” to which individuals and nations can (or at least should) maintain 
equal and unfettered access.  Not only is this analogy incorrect, its usage makes it is hard for 
political decision-makers to grasp the enormity of the threat to American infrastructure, global 
trade, and current prosperity posed by our cyber vulnerabilities.  The reality is that authoritarian 
governments—with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the lead—have transformed the cyber 
“global common” into “territorial seas” in which others pass unmolested only at their sufferance, 
and to which access can be denied.  Unfortunately, once an analogy takes hold in the popular or 
academic minds, it becomes the central core of explanation and defies most logical counter-
arguments.  The analogy of cyberspace as a global common must be killed and replaced if decision-
makers are to comprehend the future of the medium, which is not a return to unfettered global 
access.  We must clearly admit that cyber activity sails on a mosaic of adjoining territorial seas, 
not a vast, open ocean.  Cyberspace is a nationalizing and militarizing environment of coast guards 
and forward outposts.  This different analogy will assist in creating a mind-set that helps insure 
that Western democratic infrastructure does not go down with the digital ship. 
  
                                                          
1 Please cite as: Tangredi, Sam J., “From Global Commons to Territorial Sea: A Naval Analogy for the 
Nationalization of Cyberspace,” in Demchak, Chris C. and Benjamin Schechter, eds. Military Cyber Affairs: 
Cyber, Economics, and National Security 3, no. 1 (2018). 
2 Director, Institute for Future Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College 
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It is hard for political decision-makers to grasp the enormity of the threat to American 
infrastructure, global trade, and current prosperity posed by our cyber vulnerabilities.  Expedient 
businesses spend but the minimum for (apparent) protection—thereby maximizing profit and 
betting that the government will eventually provide security.3 Influenced by false analogies 
generated by the troubadours of globalization (i.e., Thomas L. Friedman), intellectuals perceive 
cyberspace to be a “global commons” to which individuals and nations can (or at least should) 
maintain equal and unfettered access.4 
As one of the engines of modern globalization, the internet is perceived as having broken 
down barriers between cultures, ideologies and societies, and created a “democratization of 
technology.”5 That might have been true during the unipolar moment. 
Currently, authoritarian governments—with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 
lead--are transforming the cyber “global commons” into “territorial seas” in which others pass 
unmolested only at their sufferance, and to which access can be denied. (“Territorial seas” is a 
rough maritime equivalent to Chris Demchak & Peter Dombrowski’s construct of a “Cybered 
Westphalia,” but with several unique differences.6) Western governments—and, in particular, 
militaries--are taking actions to reduce vulnerabilities and protections, but the reality is that 
decision-makers and intellectuals are recognizing this transformation from “global commons” to 
“territorial seas” too slowly to protect Western nations from major economic crises. 
                                                          
3 Albeit, it is true that internet firewall and computer protection companies are profitable businesses, particularly 
those supporting financial institutions.  Many corporations have in-house cyber security.  However, much of this 
protection consists of a tail chase of hacking and patching, and talent pool that provides the protection also 
conducts the hacking.  Most corporate protection cannot withstand a foreign government cybered attack, which on 
a cost-benefit basis is used to justify limiting the amount of capital spent on cyber security.  I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for bringing up this point. 
4 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2000), xvii-xxi. 
5 Ibid, pp. 59-71.  For maximum hype on the elimination of national barriers see John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration 
of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, Feb. 8, 1996, 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. 
6 Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, “The Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
Spring 2011, 32-61, http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a537560.pdf.    
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Learning by Analogy 
Social scientists argue that humans learn best by analogy. Several scholars maintain that 
“analogy is at the center of cognition.”7 It is by the comparison of a previous unknown with a 
known that we can grasp a new and complex concept. 
However, once an analogy takes hold in the popular or academic minds, it becomes the 
central core of explanation and defies most logical counter-arguments. Repeated in the popular or 
academic press, it literally takes on a life of its own as an established (and comfortable) “known.” 
Simply reasoning against its premises often has limited effect. Logic without a persuasive visual 
image rarely unseats even a shaky analogy. Only another analogy can kill an established analogy. 
The analogy of cyberspace as “global commons” was never particularly accurate and 
deserves to be abandoned.  It was based on an idealistic view of the relationship between 
technology and human nature. It interferes with an accurate understanding of the ongoing 
nationalization of cyberspace, particularly by the political decision-makers responsible for the 
protection of cybered infrastructure. It leads them to perceive that cyber threats are transient 
phenomena that can be legislated or negotiated away in a cooperative world. 
This perception is not confined to academic communities or the most optimistic.8 The U.S. 
National Defense Strategy (NDS) signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2005 clearly 
describes cyberspace as a global commons.9 U.S. National Security Strategies, along with 
subsequent NDSs, have maintained this assumption with slight changes in wording. The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America of December 2017—signed by a President widely 
                                                          
7 In particular, Douglas R. Hofstadter, “Analogy as the Core of Cognition,” in Dedre Gentner, Keith J. Holyoak and 
Boiche N. Kokinov, eds., The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press/Bradford Press, 2001), 499-538. 
8 A major academic project that used analogies to explain possible cybered warfare threat scenarios is the Naval 
Postgraduate’s “Cyber Analogies” project created by Emily Goldman and John Arquilla. Their primary report is 
Emily Goldman and John Arquilla, eds., Cyber Analogies (Technical Report NPS-DA-14-001), February 28, 
2014, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40037/NPS-DA-14-001.pdf.  However, Goldman and 
Arquilla’s use of analogies is different than that or the current article.  The analogies are intended to relate specific 
cyber issues to other events in history, rather than create an analogy for cyberspace itself.  As the editors describe: 
“Cyber issues are inherently tough to explain in layman’s terms. The future is always open and undetermined, and 
the numbers of actors and the complexity of their relations are too great to give definitive guidance about future 
developments. In this report, historical analogies, carefully developed and properly applied, help indicate a 
direction for action by reducing complexity and making the future at least cognately manageable.” 
9 Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 
March 2005, 13, http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2005_NDS.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-124535-
143.  
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seen as critical of internationalism—refers to cyberspace as a “commons domain” belonging 
“within the framework of international law.”10  
The opposing reality is that not only is this “global commons” co-inhabited by cyber-
criminals, hate and terrorist groups and malignant operators, but authoritarian governments in 
some of the largest countries don’t view cyberspace as a “global commons” (free from national 
control) at all. Since cyberspace is not a physical dimension (outside of computers, cables and 
routers), it is hard to describe it in terms of clearly marked and absolutely controlled territory. 
However, there is an appropriate analogy drawn from maritime realm and naval strategy.  Rather 
than a “global commons,” cyberspace functions as a mosaic of adjoining, and sometimes 
overlapping “territorial seas.” 
Global Commons versus Territorial Seas 
The global commons are the spaces and dimensions on (and above) the earth which are the 
territory of no one nation, but can be used by all in accordance with international law and political 
custom. Global commons are usually defined in a legal sense. The origins of the concept lay in 
both the writings of Hugo Grotius (in terms of “freedom of the seas”) and in English custom and 
law (in terms of commons pastures located near villages). However, global commons can be 
functionally defined as mediums humans use for communications, transportation and commercial 
and information exchange, but cannot normally inhabit.11 
On earth, the geographically largest and most physically accessible global commons are 
the oceans, which include the air above it, as well as most (but not all) of the seabed below it. Air 
space is a commons only above the oceans, which is why it is considered a part of the maritime 
commons. Over land, air space is territorial. Outer space is also a global commons, but is not as 
physically accessible. Obviously not physically accessible with predigital means, cyberspace has 
nevertheless been repeatedly conceptualized as a global commons and, if it were true, it would be 
                                                          
10 President Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, 41, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
11 For a more detailed explanation of the logic behind this definition, and how it relates to navies, see Sam J. 
Tangredi, “Beyond the Sea and Jointness,” in Thomas J. Cutler, ed., The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Strategy 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 141-150. 
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the commons most utilized by individuals, albeit for information exchange rather than physical 
transfer of trade or discovery. 
Following the long established concept of the “freedom of the (high) seas,” global 
commons are presumed to be immune from boundaries and national jurisdictions. Importantly, the 
security and efficiency of international trade are dependent on unfettered access to global 
commons. In other words, the commons are essential for global free market economics. Yet, 
“freedom of the seas” (as with all international law) has been periodically challenged. Nations 
have had to fight to ensure their access to maritime trade; others have fought to deny such access 
to those they perceive to be enemies.  
In contrast to global commons, territorial seas are ocean waters--extending to 12 miles off 
a coastline--in which the adjourning coastal state can legally apply certain sovereign rights.12 There 
is also an additional 12-mile “contiguous zone” which functions similarly. However, there are 
nuances as to how sovereign rights may be applied.  Unlike in internal waters, such as exclusive 
rivers and lakes, where a nation’s sovereignty is absolute (similar to the airspace above national 
territory), international law provides for “innocent passage” through territorial seas, also called 
transit passage. Under innocent passage, vessels or aircraft of another state can pass as long as they 
do not (relatively) deviate from the most expeditious course transiting from the high seas across 
the territorial seas to regain the high seas. Nevertheless, the coastal state can effectively block 
access by determining that passage may not be innocent—for example, to search for illegal drugs, 
illegal fishing, other criminal activities, and sanctioned weapons (WMD), etc. Warships are 
generally not stopped lest the action causes war, but merchant traffic is halted with some 
frequency. 
These nuances make it more appropriate to apply the territorial sea analogy to cyberspace 
access – particularly concerning use of the internet – than the global commons concept. It is 
difficult for nations participating in the global economy to block all “innocent cyber passage” (or 
                                                          
12 A useful diagram of the separation between territorial seas, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and high 
seas can be found on the New Zealand Environmental Organization’s website: 
http://www.environmentguide.org.nz/issues/marine/marine-management/areas/. Originally, territorial seas were 
considered 3-miles in width (supposedly the maximum range of cannon fire in the 1700s), but were extended to 
12-miles (the range of 5 inch coastal battery gun in the 1900s) under customary international law, and were 
codified as such under the UN Law of the Sea convention. 
5
Tangredi: From Global Commons to Territorial Seas: A Naval Analogy for the Nationalization of Cyberspace
Published by Scholar Commons, 2018
6 
reception) without considerable costs. But it can block internet access on those subjects and 
functions that it chooses. 
This is where the analogy of cyberspace as a territorial sea differs from Demchak and 
Dombrowski’s “cybered Westphalia” analogy. While the allusion to the Westphalian construct has 
validity as concerns legal sovereignty, the practical situation is that it may be too costly for some 
authoritarian states to try to block or intercept all traffic—particularly if indirectly (or directly) 
benefits the internal economy or fosters personal relations. As in an example drawn from Thomas 
Friedman, Friedman’s mother plays on-line bridge with players located in Siberia.13 It may not 
behoove the Russian government to interfere with online bridge, but, instead, might expediently 
consider it “innocent passage” from one foreign mind to a citizen and back to the foreign mind. 
Yet, as if in a territorial sea, the Russian government can functionally choose to block any internet 
traffic that it deems objectionable, such as news or opinion unfavorable to its authoritarian 
government. 
Expanding Territorial Seas and Shrinking the Global Commons 
Another rationale for the territorial seas analogy has been generated by a growing effort by 
authoritarian states to shrink the access of others to the global commons. This parallels the efforts 
to take sovereign control over cyberspace and internet access. 
Today a number of coastal states, most with authoritarian governments, attempt to claim 
sovereignty over segments of the maritime commons despite its specified codification under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (effective 16 November 1994). The most 
outstanding example is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which—despite being a signatory 
to the Law of the Sea--claims almost the entirety of the South China Sea, which is also bordered 
by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore. The claim is based on an 
assertion of “historical rights,” which are themselves based on a largely spurious history.14 To put 
it in the perspective of distance, the PRC claims sovereignty over South China Sea islets that are 
                                                          
13 Friedman, xvii-xix. 
14 Bill Hayton, “The Modern Origin’s of China’s South China Sea Claims: Maps, Misunderstandings, and the 
Maritime Geobody,” Modern China, May 4, 2018; “China’s Claim to the Spratly Islands is Just a Mistake,” Center 
for International Maritime Security, www.cimsec.org, May 16, 2018. 
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over 800 nautical miles from its own internationally recognized coastline, but within 250 nautical 
miles from that of Vietnam. 
If the “historical claim” justification was applied to cyberspace as the Chinese government 
argues, then – ironically – the global internet would clearly be under the legal sovereignty of the 
United States as initial creator.  
Additionally, many states perceive the transit of warships to be other-than-innocent 
passage by definition and attempt to restrict military traffic. This is a primary claim of the PRC; 
however, several other nations hold similar perceptions although few have ever attempted to 
interfere with such transit. In some cases, unique face-saving procedures were adopted. For many 
years, Indonesia claimed that warships transiting the Lombok Strait (a recognized international 
strait) required their permission. In an almost humorous solution, the United States would 
announce as a courtesy to the Indonesian government and to ensure navigational safety, but 
without seeking permission, that its warships intended to transit the strait. The Indonesia inevitable 
gave its “permission,” since it chose to interpret these announcements as a request.  
As previously noted, a number of states, most with authoritarian governments, have 
effectively declared sovereignty over their ‘own’ segments of cyberspace by monitoring, 
controlling, censoring and modifying the content and routing of the internet and cybered 
communications across and within their borders. If one accepts for the moment that cyberspace is 
indeed a global commons, then the actions to control the flow of cybered communication across 
borders also reduces the overall “size” of the cyber commons, effectively reducing the transit rights 
of the users. Unfortunately, no one has come up with the equivalent of a Lombok Strait solution. 
Unlike the attempts to challenge the unilateral claims reducing the maritime commons, 
through “freedom of navigation” operations consisting of warship transits, there seems no practical 
way to publicly challenge claims of sovereignty to “territorial” cyberspace. In Western nations, 
internet access is considered a commercial product, subject to only limited regulation, not a 
government-controlled function.  Thus, even if Western governments were interested in becoming 
involved in challenges to sovereignty, there is no legal basis for them to “force” the passage of 
digital packets across the “internet borders” of another nation.  Such might be done surreptitiously 
7
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through hacking, but surreptitious actions are not considered a means of upholding legal rights.  A 
freedom of navigation operation is conducted overtly, often generating very public controversy.15 
This inability to publicly claim a right to access is yet another reason to kill the analogy of 
cyberspace as a global commons. Instead, authoritarian states can simply patrol their territorial 
cyber seas with a “coast guard” of censoring and blocking devices. Commercial traffic can be 
allowed through if deemed truly innocent passage, but the cyber “coast guards” can determine 
their own interpretations of what is innocent. There is no accepted international definition, unlike 
under the Law of the Sea. Yet, like maritime territorial seas, smugglers (hackers) might be able to 
evade the controls, and the cyber commands of militaries may be able to force passage of its 
“warships” without triggering an overt war. Thus, cyberspace functions as territorial seas under 
the varying interpretations of democratic and authoritarian states. Democratic states tend to 
examine only a small percentage of traffic based on just cause; authoritarian states attempt to 
examine it all. 
The Nationalization and Militarization of Cyberspace 
Returning to the (dying) analogy of cyberspace as a global commons, the incentive for 
“militarization” as well as nationalization (using military methods) of the presumed “peaceful” 
global commons of cyber space (as a means for closing it off) is obviously high for those 
governments who seek to control access to the “territorial (cyber) sea.” However, there is a further 
incentive. 
The ability of the U.S. to utilize and—if it so chooses--to militarily control access and use 
of the maritime and space commons by others have been acknowledge by scholars and 
practitioners alike as primary sources of our global military strength.16 Without access to the 
commons, the United States could not effectively deploy its joint force on a global basis. The U.S. 
possesses both the transport and logistics capabilities and the alliance structure to gain results from 
the movement of its forces through the global commons.  Other nations do not, or can do so to 
only a limited extent. 
                                                          
15 Concerning a recent example see Ben Werner, “Pentagon Pledges More Freedom of Navigation Operations in the 
South China Sea,” USNI News, May 31, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/05/31/34016?utm. 
16 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 
28 (Summer 2003), 5-46. 
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Moreover, the massive global sea power of the United States—taking the example of the 
maritime commons—can effectively shut off access to the maritime commons by any other nation, 
if used (and concentrated) for that purpose. (The ability to do so concerning space is currently 
under debate.) Fully legal access to the maritime commons in peacetime by U.S. naval and military 
assets allows American to position its forces forward in advance of any crisis or conflict, thereby 
increasing its conventional deterrence capability. It is therefore in the interests of nations hostile 
to the United States—as a logical part of their anti-access strategies--to continuously seek a 
reduction in the size and scope of all the global commons through peacetime lawfare.17 
To transform a “legal” cyber commons into a territorial sea is a step in preventing potential 
U.S. access to one of the sources of its greatest strength—soft power.18 Most authoritarian states 
assume that American soft power buttresses and facilitates the hard power of the United States. 
With the digitalization of society, much of this soft (cultural) power is most easily transmitted via 
the internet. From the authoritarian perspective, the militarization of cyberspace is a logical 
component of any anti-access strategy. This involves an offensive approach that can make the 
coast guards of cyberspace censorship and control even more effective. Instead of merely 
positioning forces within one’s cyber territorial seas, one could face the U.S. forward in its own 
territorial cyber waters through the use of military-grade hacking or intrusion. Or one can enlist 
ostensibly non-military proxies to conduct such activities, in the same way that the PRC’s People’s 
Liberation Army Navy uses a paid maritime militia of ostensibly-commercial and fishing vessels 
to routinely harass sovereign vessels of the United States and others in the South China Sea, 
sometimes appropriating their equipment.19 
                                                          
17 The most detailed discussion of anti-access strategies and its relationship to global commons is in Sam J. 
Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). 
18 Joseph Nye is the creator of the “soft power” concept.  He has since written numerous pieces on its application in 
different contexts, most recently in cyberspace. See Nye Jr, J. S. (1990 (reprint 2016)). Bound to lead: The 
changing nature of American power, Basic Books. 
19 The most notable appropriation incident was PRC seizure of an ocean glider operated by USNS Bowditch on 
December 15, 2016.  It was returned after several days of examination and media attention.  See such reports as 
Dan Lamothe and Missy Ryan, “Pentagon: Chinese naval ship seized an unmanned U.S. underwater vehicle in the 
South China Sea,” Washington Post, December 17, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/ 
16/defense-official-chinese-naval-ship-seized-an-unmanned-u-s-ocean-glider/; Sam LaGrone, “Updated: Chinese 
Seize U.S. Navy Unmanned Vehicle,” USNI News, December 16, 2016, 
https://news.usni.org/2016/12/16/breaking-chinese-seize-u-s-navy-unmanned-vehicle; Sam J. Tangredi, “Tax 
China for Gray-Zone Infractions,” Proceedings Today, May 2017, 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-05/tax-china-gray-zone-infractions.     
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Additionally, the PRC has constructed a series of islands on reefs and awash shallows 
within international waters and within the disputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other 
nations. These artificial islands—sometimes dubbed the “great wall of sand”—have runways and 
are armed with anti-air weapons, with indications that tunnels for additional weapons and hardened 
shelters for strike missiles are now being built.20 Although a signatory of the United Nations Law 
of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS), the PRC refuses to accept international court decisions concerning 
its possession and control of these artificial features. A piece of the maritime global commons has 
therefore become a de factor territorial sea. This denial of a piece of the maritime commons 
through militarization is a potential model for “national outposts” within the cyberspace of the 
global internet overall. The new territorial seas analogy once again holds. 
Killing and Replacing the Analogy 
The analogy of cyberspace as a global commons must indeed be killed if decision-makers 
are to truly comprehend the future of the medium. The future is not a return to unfettered global 
access—unless by a miracle the most powerful authoritarian states become democratic. As seen in 
the South China Sea, the efforts of the PRC to nationalize rocks in the middle of the sea and create 
de facto territorial waters are ongoing and difficult to counter in practical terms. As noted 
elsewhere, freedom of navigation operations can be publically ignored (thereby lessening their 
public effect) and soon only international lawyers will care. 
If academics and analysts cling to the analogy—let’s call it fantasy—that cyberspace is 
still, or should be a global commons (if it ever was), decision-makers will not recognize the reality 
and will not take cybered threats as seriously as they deserve. Neither will the analogy help 
persuade businesses to pay for safeguards to maintain innocent passage. 
As a first step, the global commons analogy must be driven out of future National Defense 
and National Security Strategies. Perhaps the USCYBERCOM staff can take on that task as part 
involvement in Joint Staff reviews and the strategy guidance drafting process. We must clearly 
admit that cyber activity sails on a mosaic of adjoining territorial seas, not a vast, open ocean. It is 
a nationalizing and militarizing environment of coast guards and forward outposts.  The different 
                                                          
20 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building,” December 14, 2017, 
https://amti.csis.org/constructive-year-Chinese-building.  
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analogy will assist in creating a mind-set that helps insure that Western democratic infrastructure 
does not go down with the ship. 
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